NC Court Affirms Death Benefits Award Under State’s “Found Dead” Presumption
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina, construing the state’s version of the “found dead” rule, affirmed a decision by the state’s Industrial Commission that awarded death benefits to the dependents of a dump truck driver who died in an accident on a steep roadway [Frye v. Hamrock, LLC, 2022-NCCOA-623, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 645 (Sept. 20, 2022). Finding that the Commission had correctly utilized the Pickrell presumption—the court agreed that since the circumstances bearing on work-relatedness were unknown and the driver’s death occurred within the course of employment, the dependents could rely on a presumption that the death was work-related.
Background
In July 2017, Frye was driving a dump truck filled with a load of asphalt for his employer. He traveled in a direction on a down-hill stretch of a highway that was steeply graded, curvy, and notorious for motor vehicle accidents. The dump truck crossed the double yellow lines and collided head-on with an oncoming vehicle. The dump truck then crashed into an embankment before coming to rest on its side.
Multiple witnesses observed Frye’s truck prior to the accident. Among these witnesses was Special Agent Jennifer Trantham, who was traveling in the opposite direction on the highway. She said she noticed Frye’s truck was traveling southbound “at an unsafe speed.” She reported that she saw Frye immediately prior to the accident with what appeared to be a cigarette in his left hand with his left arm resting on the window of the truck. She added that heavy smoke was billowing from the rear axles of the truck. Later, at her deposition in this matter, Special Agent Trantham added that Frye was “very conscious” and appeared “very calm” when she saw him, and that he did not appear slumped over the wheel or down in the cab.
Frye died in the accident, as did the driver and a passenger in the other vehicle. An autopsy revealed that Frye’s cause of death was ischemic heart disease secondary to coronary heart disease. Frye’s employer and carrier denied the death benefits claim, arguing that Frye’s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
The Pickrell Presumption
Following a hearing, the deputy commissioner denied the claim. The Full Commission disagreed, concluding that Frye’s dependents were entitled to the Pickrell presumption—that, “where the circumstances bearing on work-relatedness are unknown and the death occurs within the course of employment, claimants should be able to rely on a presumption that death was work-related, and therefore compensable, whether the medical reason for death is known or unknown.” [Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 370, 368 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1988). The Commission held that the employer and carrier had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
Alternatively, the Commission concluded that Frye’s dependents had shown that Frye had been exposed to a special hazard because of Frye’s position in attempting to control a dump truck loaded with asphalt careening down the mountainside subjected him to unusually stressful and extreme conditions of his employment.
Employer’s Contentions on Appeal
On appeal, the employer and carrier argued:
- That the Full Commission erred by concluding that the Pickrell presumption applied in the case;
- That, even if the Pickrell presumption applied, the employer and carrier had successfully rebutted it; and
- That the Full Commission erred by concluding, in the alternative, that Frye’s heart attack was the result of a work-related accident.
“Found Dead”
The employer and carrier argued that the Full Commission erred in applying the Pickrell presumption because it failed to consider—or even acknowledge—the requirement that a claimant be “found dead” in order for the presumption to apply. The appellate court said the employer and carrier’s argument construed Pickrell too narrowly. The court said the circumstances of the employee’s death, not the medical reasons for death, were critical in determining whether a claimant (or the claimant’s dependents) was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The court added that a careful review of Pickrell and subsequent case law showed that being “found dead” was not, in and of itself, a necessary condition for application of the presumption as articulated by the state’s Supreme Court.
Employer: Death Not From Impact
The employer and carrier also argued that the Pickrell presumption did not apply because there was evidence that Frye died from a cause other than a compensable cause. They contended that the autopsy confirmed that Frye died from a heart attack and that he was dead prior to the time of any impact. According to the employer and carrier, the Pickrell presumption was applicable only where there is no evidence that the decedent died other than by a compensable cause.
The court noted, however, that the Full Commission expressly gave weight to the deposition testimony of the employer/carrier’s expert, in which the doctor admitted that he could not, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, give an opinion as to whether Frye had the accident because of a heart attack or whether he had a heart attack because of the circumstances of this accident. The court stressed that this finding was crucial to the case.
The court concluded that the Full Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusion that the greater weight of the evidence indicated that the circumstances regarding the work-relatedness of Frye’s heart attack were unknown and that the death occurred as the result of an injury by accident sustained in the course and scope of Frye’s employment. The court added that the Commission appropriately concluded that the Pickrell presumption applied in the case and, therefore, the burden shifted to the employer and carrier to rebut the presumption and show that the heart attack did not arise out of the employment.
Employer’s Rebuttal
The appellate court concluded that there was competent evidence in the record to support the inference that losing control of the truck precipitated Frye’s heart attack. In his deposition, The employer/carrier’s expert testified that a “stressful event,” such as losing control of a speeding truck, “could predispose one to a heart attack.” In addition, a North Carolina Highway Patrol trooper testified in his deposition that, based upon his measurements and analysis of the tire impressions made by Frye’s truck leading up to the accident, it was his opinion that Frye “was operating the vehicle” and was “applying the brakes” on the dump truck prior to the collision. Indeed, Trooper Sanders further testified that it was “obvious that Frye was trying to control [the truck] and keep it in the road.”
Rebuttal Unsuccessful
The court stressed that neither the record in the case nor the binding findings of fact support the employer/carrier’s argument that “[t]he only credible evidence in this case establishes that Frye was already deceased at the time of the actual collision” or that “the heart attack precipitated Frye’s loss of control of the vehicle. (emphasis by the court). Accordingly, the court ruled that the employer and carrier had failed to meet their burden of showing that Frye’s heart attack occurred prior to and caused his injury by accident. The Commission’s decision was affirmed.